Monopoly pricing with network externalities

被引：103

作者：

Cabral, LMB

Salant, DJ

Woroch, GA ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Calif Berkeley, Dept Econ, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA

[2] London Business Sch, London NW1 4SA, England

[3] Law & Econ Consulting Grp, Emeryville, CA 94608 USA

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 1999年 / 17卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/S0167-7187(97)00028-3

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

How should a monopolist price a durable good or a new technology that is subject to network externalities? In particular, should the monopolist set a low "introductory price" to attract a "critical mass" of adopters? In this paper, we provide intuition as to when and why introductory pricing might occur in the presence of network externalities. Incomplete information about demand or asymmetric information about costs is necessary for introductory pricing to occur in equilibrium when consumers are small. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：199 / 214

页数：16

共 26 条

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