Governance and bank valuation

被引：273

作者：

Caprio, Gerard ^{[1
]}

Laeven, Luc

Levine, Ross

机构：

[1] Williams Coll, Dept Econ, Williamstown, MA 01267 USA

[2] Int Monetary Fund, Washington, DC 20431 USA

[3] Brown Univ, Providence, RI 02912 USA

[4] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION | 2007年 / 16卷 / 04期

关键词：

corporate governance; securities law; regulation; banking; financial institutions; international finance; market structure;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jfi.2006.10.003

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This paper assesses the impact of the ownership structure of banks and shareholder protection laws on bank valuations while controlling for differences in bank regulations. Except in a few countries with very strong shareholder protection laws, banks are not widely held. Rather, families or the State control banks. Furthermore, (i) larger cash-flow rights by the controlling owner boost valuations, (ii) stronger shareholder protection laws increase valuations, and (iii) greater cash-flow rights mitigate the adverse effects of weak shareholder protection laws on valuations. These results suggest that ownership structure is an important mechanism for governing banks. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：584 / 617

页数：34

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