Yardstick competition and political agency problems

被引：20

作者：

Belleflamme, P

Hindriks, J

机构：

[1] Catholic Univ Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain, Belgium

[2] Catholic Univ Louvain, IAG, B-1348 Louvain, Belgium

[3] Catholic Univ Louvain, Dept Econ, B-1348 Louvain, Belgium

来源：

SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE | 2005年 / 24卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/s00355-003-0297-8

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We examine how yardstick competition between jurisdictions affects the agency problem resulting from uncertainty about politicians (adverse selection) and their policies (moral hazard). We find that yardstick comparison can contribute both to disciplining and to selecting politicians.

引用

页码：155 / 169

页数：15

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