Strategic trade policy with endogenous choice of quality and asymmetric costs

被引：101

作者：

Zhou, DS

Spencer, BJ ^{[1
]}

Vertinsky, I

机构：

[1] Univ British Columbia, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2, Canada

[2] NBER, Fac Commerce, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2, Canada

[3] City Univ Hong Kong, Fac Business, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R China

[4] Univ British Columbia, FEPA, Forest Sci Ctr, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z4, Canada

来源：

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS | 2002年 / 56卷 / 01期

基金：

加拿大自然科学与工程研究理事会;

关键词：

investment in quality; strategic tirade policy; R&D subsidies; vertical product differentiation;

D O I：

10.1016/S0022-1996(01)00118-0

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper examines strategic trade and joint welfare maximizing incentives towards investment in the quality of exports by an LDC and a developed country. Firms first compete in qualities and then export to an imperfectly competitive, third country market. Under Bertrand competition, unilateral policy involves an investment subsidy by the low-quality LDC and an investment tax by the developed country, whereas jointly optimal policy calls for the reverse so as to reduce price competition by increasing product differentiation. Under Cournot competition, unilateral policy is also reversed from the Bertrand outcome, but jointly optimal policy involves a tax in both countries. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：205 / 232

页数：28

共 27 条

[1] Sequential versus simultaneous choice with endogenous quality [J].