Fixed-prize tournaments versus first-price auctions in innovation contests

被引:55
作者
Schoettner, Anja [1 ]
机构
[1] Humboldt Univ, D-10099 Berlin, Germany
关键词
innovation contest; auction; tournament; quality;
D O I
10.1007/s00199-007-0208-9
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper analyzes a procurement setting with identical firms and stochastic innovations. In contrast to the previous literature, I show that a procurer who cannot charge entry fees may prefer a fixed-prize tournament to a first-price auction. The reason is that holding an auction may leave higher rents to firms when the innovation technology is subject to large random factors.
引用
收藏
页码:57 / 71
页数:15
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