Retailing public goods: The economics of corporate social responsibility

被引:272
作者
Besley, Timothy [1 ]
Ghatak, Maitreesh [1 ]
机构
[1] London Sch Econ, London, England
关键词
CSR; public goods;
D O I
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.07.006
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper explores the feasibility and desirability of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). We identify CSR with creation of public goods or curtailment of public bads. Using a model with profit-maximizing firms, the paper shows that there is it direct parallel between CSR and traditional models of private provision of public goods. Indeed, firms that use CSR will produce public goods at exactly the same level as predicted by the standard voluntary contribution equilibrium for public goods. We compare CSR with government provision and charitable provision, discussing when CSR by private for-profit firms could have a comparative advantage in dealing with public goods provision. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1645 / 1663
页数:19
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