Rethinking Stability in South Asia: India, Pakistan, and the Competition for Escalation Dominance

被引:11
作者
Montgomery, Evan Braden [1 ]
Edelman, Eric S. [1 ]
机构
[1] Ctr Strateg & Budgetary Assessments, Washington, DC 20006 USA
关键词
Deterrence; Nuclear Weapons; Pakistan; Escalation; India;
D O I
10.1080/01402390.2014.901215
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
India and Pakistan are currently engaged in a competition for escalation dominance. While New Delhi is preparing for a limited conventional campaign against Pakistan, Islamabad is pursuing limited nuclear options to deter India. Together, these trends could increase the likelihood of nuclear conflict. India, for example, might conclude that it can launch an invasion without provoking a nuclear reprisal, while Pakistan might believe that it can employ nuclear weapons without triggering a nuclear exchange. Even if war can be avoided, these trends could eventually compel India to develop its own limited nuclear options in an effort to enhance deterrence and gain coercive leverage over Pakistan.
引用
收藏
页码:159 / 182
页数:24
相关论文
共 74 条
[1]  
Albright David, 2011, PAKISTAN APPEARS BE
[2]  
Albright David, 2011, PAKISTAN DOUBLING RA
[3]  
Ali Ahmed., 2012, Comparative Strategy, V31, P453
[4]  
[Anonymous], 2013, JANES STRATEGIC 1115
[5]  
[Anonymous], 2011, GLOBAL SECURITY 0421
[6]  
[Anonymous], NY TIMES
[7]  
[Anonymous], 2011, WASHINGTON POST
[8]  
[Anonymous], 2012, INDIAN EXPRESS 0116
[9]  
Bagchi Indrani., 2013, TIMES INDIA
[10]  
Bajpai KantiP., 1995, Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception And Management Of Crisis In South Asia