Turning a Shove into a Nudge? A "Labeled Cash Transfer" for Education

被引：178

作者：

Benhassine, Najy ^{[1
]}

Devoto, Florencia ^{[2
,3
]}

Duflo, Esther ^{[4
,5
]}

Dupas, Pascaline ^{[6
,7
]}

Pouliquen, Victor ^{[2
,8
]}

机构：

[1] World Bank, Washington, DC 20433 USA

[2] Paris Sch Econ, F-75014 Paris, France

[3] Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Act Lab JPAL, Cambridge, MA USA

[4] MIT, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA

[5] Natl Bur Econ NBER, Cambridge, MA USA

[6] Stanford Dept Econ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

[7] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[8] JPAL, Cambridge, MA USA

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY | 2015年 / 7卷 / 03期

关键词：

POVERTY ALLEVIATION; TRANSFER PROGRAMS; LABOR;

D O I：

10.1257/pol.20130225

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) have been shown to increase human capital investments, but their standard features make them expensive. We use a large randomized experiment in Morocco to estimate an alternative government-run program, a "labeled cash transfer" (LCT): a small cash transfer made to fathers of school-aged children in poor rural communities, not conditional on school attendance but explicitly labeled as an education support program. We document large gains in school participation. Adding conditionality and targeting mothers made almost no difference in our context. The program increased parents' belief that education was a worthwhile investment, a likely pathway for the results.

引用

页码：86 / 125

页数：40

共 33 条

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