Cooperation under the threat of expulsion in a public goods experiment

被引：177

作者：

Cinyabuguma, M ^{[1
]}

Page, T ^{[1
]}

Putterman, L ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Brown Univ, Dept Econ, Providence, RI 02912 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS | 2005年 / 89卷 / 08期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

public goods; collective action; punishment;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.05.011

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In a public goods experiment with the opportunity to vote to expel members of a group, we found that contributions rose to nearly 100% of endowments with significantly higher efficiency compared with a no-expulsion baseline. Our findings support the intuition that the threat of expulsion or ostracism is a device that helps some groups to provide public goods. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：1421 / 1435

页数：15

共 26 条

[1] Heterogeneous preferences and collective action [J].