A dynamic analysis of the demand for health insurance and health care

被引：44

作者：

Bolhaar, Jonneke ^{[1
,2
]}

Lindeboom, Maarten ^{[1
,2
,3
]}

van der Klaauw, Bas ^{[1
,2
]}

机构：

[1] Vrije Univ Amsterdam, NL-1081 HV Amsterdam, Netherlands

[2] Tinbergen Inst, NL-1081 HV Amsterdam, Netherlands

[3] HEB, Bergen, Norway

来源：

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2012年 / 56卷 / 04期

基金：

欧洲研究理事会;

关键词：

Supplementary private health insurance; Health care utilization; Asymmetric information; Moral hazard; Panel data; ADVERSE SELECTION; MORAL HAZARD; MEDIGAP INSURANCE; ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; ADVANTAGEOUS SELECTION; PRIVATE INSURANCE; ECONOMETRIC-MODEL; MARKETS; SERVICES; ECONOMICS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.03.002

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We find that asymmetric information is important for the uptake of supplementary private health insurance and health care utilization. We use dynamic panel data models to investigate the sources of asymmetric information and distinguish short-run selection effects into insurance from long-run selection effects. Short-run selection effects (i.e. responses to shocks) are adverse, but small in size. Also long-run effects driven by differences in, for example, preferences and risk aversion, are small. But we find some evidence for multidimensional asymmetric information. For example, mental health causes advantageous selection. Estimates of health care utilization models suggest that moral hazard is not important. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：669 / 690

页数：22

共 42 条

[1]

Bajari P, 2006, Moral hazard, adverse selection and health expenditures: A semiparametric analysis

[2] THE USE OF THE GENERAL HEALTH QUESTIONNAIRE AS AN INDICATOR OF MENTAL-HEALTH IN OCCUPATIONAL STUDIES [J].

BANKS, MH ;

CLEGG, CW ;

JACKSON, PR ;

KEMP, NJ ;

STAFFORD, EM ;

WALL, TD .

JOURNAL OF OCCUPATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY, 1980, 53 (03) :187-194

[3] Worker decisions to purchase health insurance [J].

Blumberg L.J. ;

Nichols L.M. ;

Banthin J.S. .

International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, 2001, 1 (3-4) :305-325

[4]

Bolhaar J., 2010, ADVANTAGEOUS S UNPUB

[5] The interaction of public and private insurance: Medicaid and the long-term care insurance market [J].

Brown, Jeffrey R. ;

Finkelstein, Amy .

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2008, 98 (03) :1083-1102

[6]

Buchmueller T.C., 2008, 20082 CHERE

[7]

BUNDORF MK, 2005, 11677 NBER

[8] A MICROECONOMETRIC MODEL OF THE DEMAND FOR HEALTH-CARE AND HEALTH-INSURANCE IN AUSTRALIA [J].

CAMERON, AC ;

TRIVEDI, PK ;

MILNE, F ;

PIGGOTT, J .

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1988, 55 (01) :85-106

[9] Asymmetric information in health insurance: evidence from the National Medical Expenditure Survey [J].

Cardon, JH ;

Hendel, I .

RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2001, 32 (03) :408-427

[10]

Chernew M, 1997, HEALTH SERV RES, V32, P453

← 1 2 3 4 5 →