Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices

被引：116

作者：

Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R ^{[1
]}

Kahn, CM

机构：

[1] Univ Illinois, Dept Finance, Champaign, IL 61820 USA

[2] Univ Illinois, Dept Business Adm, Champaign, IL 61820 USA

来源：

ECONOMIC THEORY | 1998年 / 12卷 / 02期

关键词：

JEL Classification Numbers: D44; D82; C72.;

D O I：

10.1007/s001990050220

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Auctions in which individuals can purchase more than one unit of the good being sold differ in striking ways from multi-unit auctions in which individuals may purchase only one unit. The uniform price auction in particular frequently yields Nash equilibria in which bidders underbid for their second unit and therefore pay very low prices for the good. This paper characterizes equilibria for the uniform price auction.

引用

页码：227 / 258

页数：32

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