Relative perfonnance evaluation and the turnover of provincial leaders in China

被引：381

作者：

Chen, Y

Li, HB ^{[1
]}

Zhou, LA

机构：

[1] Peking Univ, Guanghua Sch Management, Beijing, Peoples R China

[2] Chinese Univ Hong Kong, Dept Econ, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2005年 / 88卷 / 03期

关键词：

relative performance evaluation; incentives of local government; China;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2005.05.003

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Using data from China, this paper examines the role of relative performance evaluation in the turnover decisions made by the central government. We find that the turnover of provincial leaders hinges on provincial economic performance relative to their immediate predecessors. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：421 / 425

页数：5

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