Cyclic Markov equilibria in stochastic games

被引：37

作者：

Flesch, J

Thuijsman, F

Vrieze, K

机构：

[1] Department of Mathematics, University of Limburg, 6200 MD Maastricht

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 1997年 / 26卷 / 03期

关键词：

Economic Theory; Game Theory; Similar Type; Stochastic Game; Markov Strategy;

D O I：

10.1007/BF01263273

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We examine a three-person stochastic game where the only existing equilibria consist of cyclic Markov strategies. Unlike in two-person games of a similar type, stationary epsilon-equilibria (epsilon > 0) do not exist for this game. Besides we characterize the set of feasible equilibrium rewards.

引用

页码：303 / 314

页数：12

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