Are busy boards detrimental?

被引:327
作者
Field, Laura [1 ]
Lowry, Michelle [1 ]
Mkrtchyan, Anahit [2 ]
机构
[1] Penn State Univ, Smeal Coll Business, University Pk, PA 16802 USA
[2] Northeastern Univ, DAmore McKim Sch Business, Boston, MA 02115 USA
关键词
Corporate Governance; Board of Directors; Initial public offerings; Venture capital; DIRECTOR REPUTATION; CORPORATE-OWNERSHIP; FIRMS; DETERMINANTS; PERFORMANCE; TURNOVER; DECISION; RETURNS; IMPACT;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.02.004
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Busy directors have been widely criticized as being ineffective. However, we hypothesize that busy directors offer advantages for many firms. While busy directors may be less effective monitors, their experience and contacts arguably make them excellent advisors. Among IPO firms, which have minimal experience with public markets and likely rely heavily on their directors for advising, we find busy boards to be common and to contribute positively to firm value. Moreover, these positive effects of busy boards extend to all but the most established firms. Benefits are lowest among Forbes 500 firms, which likely require more monitoring than advising. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:63 / 82
页数:20
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