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INTEGRATED POLITICAL STRATEGY

被引：29
作者：
de Figueiredo, John M. [1 ,1 ]
机构：
[1] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
来源：
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF STRATEGY | 2009年 / 26卷
关键词：
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS; CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL; ORGANIZED INTERESTS; INFORMATION; POLICY; COURT; LOBBYISTS; FIRMS; COMPETITION; PROTECTION;
D O I：
10.1108/S0742-3322(2009)0000026017
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper develops an organizing framework for research on corporate political strategy. It reviews the literature and then identifies a number of open research questions and streams for potential investigation. The paper closes by developing a theory to explain why, when, and how a firm will pursue multi-forum political action as part of its nonmarket and integrated strategy.
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页码：459 / 486
页数：28
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