Balancedness of infrastructure cost games

被引:15
作者
Norde, H
Fragnelli, V
García-Jurado, I
Patrone, F
Tijs, S
机构
[1] Tilburg Univ, Fac Econ & Business Adm, Dept Econometr, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands
[2] Tilburg Univ, CentER, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands
[3] Univ Piemonte Orientale, I-15100 Alessandria, Italy
[4] Univ Santiago de Compostela, Dept Stat & OR, Fac Math, Santiago De Compostela 15771, Spain
[5] Univ Genoa, Dept Math, I-16146 Genoa, Italy
关键词
game theory; cost allocation; balancedness;
D O I
10.1016/S0377-2217(01)00073-X
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
In this paper we study the class of infrastructure cost games. A game in this class models the infrastructure costs (both building and maintenance) produced when a set of users of different types makes use of a certain infrastructure, which may consist of several facilities. Special attention is paid to one facility infrastructure cost games. Such games are modeled as the sum of an airport game and a maintenance cost game. It turns out that the core and nucleolus of these games are very closely related to the core and nucleolus of an associated generalized airport game. Furthermore we provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which an infrastructure cost game is balanced. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:635 / 654
页数:20
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