A Field Study on Matching with Network Externalities

被引：48

作者：

Baccara, Mariagiovanna ^{[1
]}

Imrohoroglu, Ayse ^{[2
]}

Wilson, Alistair J. ^{[3
]}

Yariv, Leeat ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] Washington Univ, Olin Sch Business, St Louis, MO 63130 USA

[2] Univ So Calif, Dept Finance & Business Econ, Marshall Sch Business, Los Angeles, CA 90089 USA

[3] Univ Pittsburgh, Dept Econ, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA

[4] CALTECH, Div Humanities & Social Sci, Pasadena, CA 91125 USA

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2012年 / 102卷 / 05期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

PARTIALLY IDENTIFIED PARAMETERS; CONFIDENCE-INTERVALS; COALITION STRUCTURES; ECONOMETRIC-MODELS; BUSINESS SCHOOLS; GAMES; EFFICIENCY; STABILITY; INFERENCE;

D O I：

10.1257/aer.102.5.1773

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study the effects of network externalities within a protocol for matching faculty to offices in a new building. Using web and survey data on faculty's attributes and choices, we identify the different layers of the social network: institutional affiliation, coauthorships, and friendships. We quantify the effects of network externalities on choices and outcomes, disentangle the layers of the networks, and quantify their relative influence. Finally, we assess the protocol used from a welfare perspective. Our study suggests the importance and feasibility of accounting for network externalities in assignment problems and evaluates techniques that can be employed to this end. (JEL C78, C93, D62, D85, Z13)

引用

页码：1773 / 1804

页数：32

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