Leverage Cycles and the Anxious Economy

被引:271
作者
Fostel, Ana [1 ]
Geanakoplos, John [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] George Washington Univ, Washington, DC 20002 USA
[2] Yale Univ, Dept Econ, New Haven, CT 06520 USA
[3] External Fac Santa Fe Inst, Santa Fe, NM USA
关键词
D O I
10.1257/aer.98.4.1211
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We provide a pricing theory for emerging asset classes, like emerging markets, that are not yet mature enough to be attractive to the general public. We show how leverage cycles can cause contagion, flight to collateral, and issuance rationing in a frequently recurring phase we call the anxious economy. Our model provides an explanation for the volatile access of emerging economies to international financial markets, and,for three stylized facts we identify in emerging markets and high yield data since the late 1990s. Our analytical framework is a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents, incomplete markets, and endogenous collateral, plus an extension encompassing adverse selection.
引用
收藏
页码:1211 / 1244
页数:34
相关论文
共 43 条
[1]  
Agenor PR, 1998, INT MONET FUND S PAP, V45, P207
[2]  
AGHION P, 2006, J ECON THEORY, V119, P6
[3]   Sovereign debt as a contingent claim: a quantitative approach [J].
Alfaro, L ;
Kanczuk, F .
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, 2005, 65 (02) :297-314
[4]  
[Anonymous], 2004, 10520 NAT BUR EC RES
[5]  
BERNARD PS, 1996, ESAIM P, V1, P15
[6]   Efficient competitive equilibria with adverse selection [J].
Bisin, A ;
Gottardi, P .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 2006, 114 (03) :485-516
[7]  
BRUNNERMEIER M, REV FINANCI IN PRESS
[8]   A CONSTANT RECONTRACTING MODEL OF SOVEREIGN DEBT [J].
BULOW, J ;
ROGOFF, K .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1989, 97 (01) :155-178
[9]   International and domestic collateral constraints in a model of emerging market crises [J].
Caballero, RJ ;
Krishnamurthy, A .
JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS, 2001, 48 (03) :513-548
[10]  
Calvo G.A., 1998, J APPL ECON, V1, P35, DOI [10.1080/15140326.1998.12040516, DOI 10.1080/15140326.1998.12040516]