Selling Cookies

被引：100

作者：

Bergemann, Dirk ^{[1
]}

Bonatti, Alessandro ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Yale Univ, New Haven, CT 06520 USA

[2] MIT, Alfred P Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS | 2015年 / 7卷 / 03期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

INFORMATION; MARKETS; SALES;

D O I：

10.1257/mic.20140155

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We propose a model of data provision and data pricing. A single data provider controls a large database that contains information about the match value between individual consumers and individual firms (advertisers). Advertisers seek to tailor their spending to the individual match value. The data provider prices queries about individual consumers' characteristics (cookies). We determine the equilibrium data acquisition and pricing policies. Advertisers choose positive and/or negative targeting policies. The optimal query price influences the composition of the targeted set. The price of data decreases with the reach of the database and increases with the fragmentation of data sales.

引用

页码：259 / 294

页数：36

共 31 条

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ABRAHAM I., 2014, PEACHES LEMONS COOKI

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