The profit-structure relationship in legally protected banking markets using efficiency measures

被引：19

作者：

Frame, WS ^{[1
]}

Kamerschen, DR ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV GEORGIA,DEPT ECON,ATHENS,GA 30602

来源：

REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 1997年 / 12卷 / 01期

关键词：

x-efficiency; profit-structure; banking; entry; market-power; mergers;

D O I：

10.1023/A:1007798618469

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Our various tests suggest that our sample banks that are shielded from competition by severe intrastate branching restrictions have market power. This analysis has allowed us to test rigorously the adverse effects of legal and possibly market barriers to entry. We reject the notion that profits are a result of superior a-efficiency. We conclude if these results are corroborated by further research (e.g., using other measures of profit, efficiency, capital, etc), and if these and/or other barriers remain, the Federal Reserve should be concerned with the competitive impacts of rural, in-market bank mergers.

引用

页码：9 / 22

页数：14

共 28 条

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AMEL D, 1992, ANTITRUST B, V37, P631

[2]

[Anonymous], IND CONCENTRATION NE

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