Executive turnover and firm performance in China

被引：189

作者：

Kato, TK

Long, C

机构：

[1] Colgate Univ, Dept Econ, Hamilton, NY 13346 USA

[2] Columbia Univ, Sch Business, CJEB, New York, NY 10027 USA

[3] Stanford Univ, Hoover Inst, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2006年 / 96卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1257/000282806777212576

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：363 / 367

页数：5

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