Management turnover across the corporate hierarchy

被引：192

作者：

Fee, CE ^{[1
]}

Hadlock, CJ ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Michigan State Univ, Eli Broad Grad Sch Management, Dept Finance, E Lansing, MI 48824 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS | 2004年 / 37卷 / 01期

关键词：

management turnover; corporate hierarchy; teams; performance measurement; employment opportunities;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jacceco.2003.11.003

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We study management turnover for the top five executives in a sample of 443 large firms from 1993 through 1998. The rate of forced turnover for non-CEOs is at least as great as that for CEOs, but the sensitivity of turnover to firm performance is smaller for non-CEOs. The probability that a non-CEO leaves office is elevated around CEO dismissals, particularly when the replacement CEO is an outsider. Many dismissed executives obtain new employment, but on average their new positions are significantly inferior to their prior jobs. Labor market outcomes are related to past compensation and the circumstances around departure. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：3 / 38

页数：36

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