Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect

被引：48

作者：

Board, Simon ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Toronto, Dept Econ, Toronto, ON M5S 3G7, Canada

来源：

ECONOMIC THEORY | 2009年 / 38卷 / 01期

关键词：

Auctions; Information revelation; Bundling; BUNDLING DECISIONS;

D O I：

10.1007/s00199-006-0177-4

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

When there are two bidders, releasing independent information in an English auction with private values makes the seller worse off. However, this is no longer true with more bidders: when there is enough competition, revelation benefits the auctioneer. In three examples the dividing case is shown to be three bidders. This allocation effect applies to other standard auctions and parallels the bundling decision in a multi-unit auction.

引用

页码：125 / 135

页数：11

共 16 条

[1] Optimal multi-object auctions [J].