Competition and the evolution of efficiency

被引：16

作者：

Sjostrom, T

Weitzman, ML

机构：

[1] Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 1996年 / 30卷 / 01期

关键词：

competition; evolution; group selection; prisoner's dilemma; X-inefficiency;

D O I：

10.1016/S0167-2681(96)00840-2

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper presents an evolutionary model of the relationship between inter-firm competition and intra-firm organizational or X-efficiency. We model X-inefficiency within the firm as a prisoner's dilemma effort-monitoring problem, whose evolution is influenced by external competitive pressure from other firms. A closed form stochastic equilibrium displaying ''survival of the fittest'' dynastic cycles is derived and analyzed. The main result is that there exists a well defined sense in which competition is a surprisingly powerful force for efficiency.

引用

页码：25 / 43

页数：19

共 10 条

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Courant R., 1988, Differential and Integral Calculus, V1

[2] THE MARKET MECHANISM AS AN INCENTIVE SCHEME [J].