Do firms' relationships with principal customers/suppliers affect shareholders' income?

被引:163
作者
Wang, Jin [1 ]
机构
[1] Wilfrid Laurier Univ, Sch Business & Econ, Waterloo, ON N2L 3C5, Canada
关键词
Dividend; Customer; Supplier; Financial distress; Information certification; ECONOMETRIC EVALUATION ESTIMATOR; FREE CASH FLOW; CAPITAL STRUCTURE; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; DIVIDEND CHANGES; CUSTOMERS; REPURCHASES; HYPOTHESIS; PROPENSITY; SUPPLIERS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.06.007
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
In this paper, we examine whether a firm's relationship with its principal customers/suppliers affects its payout policies. A firm has customer-supplier relationships when its business depends on a small number of major customers/suppliers. The extant literature indicates two channels through which customer-supplier relationships might negatively affect a firm's dividend payments: 1) the high financial distress costs associated with relationship-specific investments and 2) the information certification effect of the principle customer. Consistent with expectations, our study reveals a negative relationship between a firm's dependence on customer-supplier relationships and its dividend payments. This result is robust to various model specifications and consistent with evidence regarding the time-series properties of dividends. Moreover, we find that high financial distress costs associated with relationship-specific investments are the key channel through which a firm's customer-supplier relationship affects its dividend payments. Overall, our results suggest that a firm's relationship with its non-financial stakeholders, such as principal customers/suppliers, is an important determinant of its shareholders' income. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:860 / 878
页数:19
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