Public Opinion and Executive Compensation

被引：170

作者：

Kuhnen, Camelia M. ^{[1
]}

Niessen, Alexandra ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Northwestern Univ, Dept Finance, Kellogg Sch Management, Evanston, IL 60208 USA

[2] Univ Mannheim, Dept Finance, D-68167 Mannheim, Germany

来源：

MANAGEMENT SCIENCE | 2012年 / 58卷 / 07期

关键词：

executive compensation; public opinion; media coverage; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; CEO COMPENSATION; MANAGERIAL POWER; PANEL-DATA; PAY; PERFORMANCE; MEDIA; REPUTATION; INVESTORS; DESIGN;

D O I：

10.1287/mnsc.1110.1490

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学];

学科分类号：

12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

We investigate whether public opinion influences the level and structure of executive compensation. During 1992-2008, the negativity of press coverage of chief executive officer (CEO) pay varied significantly, with stock options being the most criticized pay component. We find that after more negative press coverage of CEO pay, firms reduce option grants and increase less contentious types of pay such as salary, although overall compensation does not change. The reduction in option pay after increased press negativity is more pronounced when firms, CEOs, and boards have stronger reputation concerns. Our within-firm, within-year identification shows the results cannot be explained by annual changes in accounting rules regarding executive compensation, stock market conditions, or pay mean reversion.

引用

页码：1249 / 1272

页数：24