The market for evaluations

被引:124
作者
Avery, C [1 ]
Resnick, P
Zeckhauser, R
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Kennedy Sch Govt, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[2] Univ Michigan, Sch Informat, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1257/aer.89.3.564
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Recent developments in computer networks have driven the cost of distributing information virtually to zero, creating extraordinary opportunities for sharing product evaluations. We present pricing and subsidy mechanisms that operate through a computerized market and induce the efficient provision of evaluations. The mechanisms overcome three major challenges: first, evaluations, which are public goods, are likely to be underprovided; second, an inefficient ordering of evaluators may arise; third, the optimal quantity of evaluations depends on what is learned from the initial evaluations. (JEL D70, D83, H41, L15).
引用
收藏
页码:564 / 584
页数:21
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