Does Delaware law improve firm value?

被引:301
作者
Daines, R [1 ]
机构
[1] NYU, New York, NY 10012 USA
关键词
law; corporate governance; investor protection;
D O I
10.1016/S0304-405X(01)00086-1
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
I present evidence consistent with the theory that Delaware corporate law improves firm value and facilitates the sale of public firms. Using Tobin's Q as an estimate of firm value, I find that Delaware firms are worth significantly more than similar firms incorporated elsewhere. The result is robust to controls for firm size, diversification, profitability, investment opportunity, industry, managerial ownership, and unobservable firm heterogeneity. Delaware firms are also significantly more likely to receive takeover bids and be acquired. Results are robust to controls for endogeneity. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:525 / 558
页数:34
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