The impact of the options backdating scandal on shareholders

被引:63
作者
Bernile, Gennaro [1 ]
Jarrell, Gregg A. [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Miami, Sch Business Adm, Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA
[2] Univ Rochester, William E Simon Grad Sch Business Adm, Rochester, NY 14627 USA
关键词
Agency costs; Event-study; Option backdating; Corporate scandal; ABNORMAL STOCK RETURNS; INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS; MANAGEMENT TURNOVER; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; CORPORATE LAWSUITS; EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS; FIRM PERFORMANCE; DISTRESSED FIRMS; TEST STATISTICS; CREDIT SPREADS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jacceco.2008.11.004
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
The revelation that scores of firms engaged in the illegal manipulation of stock options' grant dates (i.e. "backdating") captured much public attention. The evidence indicates that the consequences stemming from management misconduct and misrepresentation are of first-order importance in this context as shareholders of firms accused of backdating experience large negative, statistically significant abnormal returns. Furthermore, shareholders' losses are directly related to firms' likely culpability and the magnitude of the resulting restatements, despite the limited cash flow implications. And, tellingly, the losses are attenuated when tainted management of less successful firms is more likely to be replaced and relatively many firms become takeover targets. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:2 / 26
页数:25
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