Signaling unobservable product quality through a brand ally

被引:639
作者
Rao, AR [1 ]
Qu, L [1 ]
Ruekert, RW [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Minnesota, Carlson Sch Management, Minneapolis, MN 55455 USA
关键词
D O I
10.2307/3152097
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In this article, the authors examine the circumstances in which brand names convey information about unobservable quality. They argue that a brand name can convey unobservable quality credibly when false claims will result in intolerable economic losses, These losses can occur for two reasons: (1) losses of reputation or sunk investments and (2) losses of future profits that occur whether or not the brand has a reputation. The authors test this assertion in the context of the emerging practice of brand alliances. Results from several studies are supportive of the premise and suggest that, when evaluating a product that has an important unobservable attribute, consumers' quality perceptions are enhanced when a brand is allied with a second brand that is perceived to be vulnerable to consumer sanctions. The authors discuss the theoretical and substantive implications for the area of brand management.
引用
收藏
页码:258 / 268
页数:11
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