Failed cooperation in heterogeneous industries under the National Recovery Administration

被引:25
作者
Alexander, BJ
机构
[1] Department of Economics, Wellesley College, Wellesley
关键词
D O I
10.1017/S0022050700018465
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A case study, a formal model, and an analysis of Census of Manufactures data support a conclusion that cost heterogeneity was a major source of the ''compliance crisis'' affecting a number of National Recovery Administration ''codes of fair competition.'' Key elements of the argument are assumptions that progressives at the NRA allowed majority coalitions of small, high-cost firms to impose codes in heterogeneous industries, and that these codes were designed by the high-cost firms under an ultimately erroneous belief that they would be enforced by the NRA.
引用
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页码:322 / 344
页数:23
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