Controlling fiscal corruption

被引：44

作者：

Chand, SK ^{[1
]}

Moene, KO ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Oslo, N-0316 Oslo, Norway

来源：

WORLD DEVELOPMENT | 1999年 / 27卷 / 07期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/S0305-750X(99)00050-9

中图分类号：

F0 [经济学]; F1 [世界各国经济概况、经济史、经济地理]; C [社会科学总论];

学科分类号：

0201 ; 020105 ; 03 ; 0303 ;

摘要：

This paper examines the issue of how to control fiscal corruption by providing incentives to fiscal officers. A model is developed to portray the incentive effects. The results indicate that simply providing bonuses is not enough. Corruption at higher levels of management has to be contained so as to allow bonuses to become more effective, and thereby to initiate a "virtuous circle". These findings are supported by a case study of a successful attack on fiscal corruption in Ghana. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：1129 / 1140

页数：12

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