Why do firms adopt CEO stock options? Evidence from the United States

被引：74

作者：

Tzioumis, Konstantinos ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] London Sch Econ, Dept Management, Managerial Econ & Strategy Grp, London WC2A 2AE, England

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 2008年 / 68卷 / 01期

关键词：

Stock options; CEO compensation;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jebo.2007.06.008

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper examines the determinants of stock option introduction as a part of CEO compensation in listed US firms during the 1994-2004 period. The results are consistent with agency costs and recruiting considerations, Suggesting that firms do not adjust CEO compensation in order to address the 'investment horizon' problem. The findings also suggest that CEO stock option adoption is not necessarily influenced by the same factors that have been found in the literature to affect the level of CEO stock option compensation and the adoption of broad-based stock option incentives. Overall, the findings provide evidence for several theoretical predictions, thus adding to our understanding of managerial incentives. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：100 / 111

页数：12

共 45 条

[1] Wealth and executive compensation [J].