Do farmers value the environment? Evidence from a conservation reserve program auction

被引:35
作者
Vukina, Tomislav [1 ]
Zheng, Xiaoyong [1 ]
Marra, Michele [1 ]
Levy, Amando [2 ]
机构
[1] N Carolina State Univ, Dept Agr & Resource Econ, Raleigh, NC 27695 USA
[2] Brattle Grp, San Francisco, CA USA
关键词
Government auctions; Decision theory; Environmental benefits evaluation;
D O I
10.1016/j.ijindorg.2008.01.001
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The paper uses data from one Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) auction to elicit farmers' attitudes toward the environment by analyzing their bids. The CRP pays farmers to remove chosen plots of land from agricultural production and put them to a conservation use. An interesting aspect of this auction is that winners are determined by a combination of low bids and environmental scores of individual plots. Using decision theoretic approach to model this auction we show that farmers condition their bids on the strength of their environmental scores and that they value environmental benefits, especially those that increase future soil productivity of their land. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1323 / 1332
页数:10
相关论文
共 22 条
[1]   Information and competition in US forest service timber auctions [J].
Athey, S ;
Levin, J .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 2001, 109 (02) :375-417
[2]   Synergies in wireless telephony: Evidence from the broadband PCS auctions [J].
Ausubel, LM ;
Cramton, P ;
McAfee, RP ;
McMillan, J .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, 1997, 6 (03) :497-527
[3]   COMPETITIVE BIDDING IN HIGH-RISK SITUATIONS [J].
CAPEN, EC ;
CLAPP, RV ;
CAMPBELL, WM .
JOURNAL OF PETROLEUM TECHNOLOGY, 1971, 23 (JUN) :641-&
[4]   Likelihood estimation and inference in a class of nonregular econometric models [J].
Chernozhukov, V ;
Hong, A .
ECONOMETRICA, 2004, 72 (05) :1445-1480
[5]   Identification, estimation, and testing in parametric empirical models of auctions within the independent private values paradigm [J].
Donald, SG ;
Paarsch, HJ .
ECONOMETRIC THEORY, 1996, 12 (03) :517-567
[6]   PIECEWISE PSEUDO-MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION IN EMPIRICAL-MODELS OF AUCTIONS [J].
DONALD, SG ;
PAARSCH, HJ .
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1993, 34 (01) :121-148
[7]   A COMPETITIVE-BIDDING STRATEGY [J].
FRIEDMAN, L .
OPERATIONS RESEARCH, 1956, 4 (01) :104-112
[8]   Optimal nonparametric estimation of first-price auctions [J].
Guerre, E ;
Perrigne, I ;
Vuong, Q .
ECONOMETRICA, 2000, 68 (03) :525-574
[9]   Auctions with resale markets: An application to US forest service timber sales [J].
Haile, PA .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2001, 91 (03) :399-427
[10]  
HENDRICKS K, 1988, AM ECON REV, V78, P865