The Invisible Hand of Short Selling: Does Short Selling Discipline Earnings Management?

被引：215

作者：

Massa, Massimo ^{[1
]}

Zhang, Bohui ^{[2
]}

Zhang, Hong ^{[1
,3
]}

机构：

[1] INSEAD, Fontainebleau, France

[2] UNSW Australia, Business Sch, Sch Banking & Finance, Sydney, NSW, Australia

[3] Tsinghua Univ, PBC Sch Finance, Beijing, Peoples R China

来源：

REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES | 2015年 / 28卷 / 06期

基金：

澳大利亚研究理事会;

关键词：

SHORT-SALES; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; INVESTOR PROTECTION; PRICE DISCOVERY; STOCK RETURNS; MARKET; QUALITY; WORLD; INFORMATION; EFFICIENCY;

D O I：

10.1093/rfs/hhu147

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We hypothesize that short selling has a disciplining role vis-a-vis firm managers that forces them to reduce earnings management. Using firm-level short-selling data for thirty-three countries collected over a sample period from 2002 to 2009, we document a significantly negative relationship between the threat of short selling and earnings management. Tests based on instrumental variable and exogenous regulatory experiments offer evidence of a causal link between short selling and earnings management. Our findings suggest that short selling functions as an external governance mechanism to discipline managers.

引用

页码：1701 / 1736

页数：36

共 71 条

[1] The "Wall Street Walk" and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice [J].