Strategic Disclosures of Litigation Loss Contingencies When Customer-Supplier Relationships Are at Risk

被引:70
作者
Cen, Ling [1 ,2 ]
Chen, Feng [1 ]
Hou, Yu [3 ]
Richardson, Gordon D. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada
[2] Chinese Univ Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[3] Queens Univ, Kingston, ON, Canada
关键词
customer-supplier relationships; litigation loss contingency disclosures; proprietary costs; CORPORATE SUPPLIERS; REPEATED GAMES; INFORMATION; CHAIN; DETERMINANTS; ESSAYS;
D O I
10.2308/accr-51869
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
In the presence of litigation-facing suppliers, the supply chain relationship is at risk. Suppliers with principal customers (dependent suppliers) have a higher concentration of sales to customers, and they are more at risk relative to suppliers without principal customers (non-dependent suppliers). As a result, we predict and find that litigation disclosure patterns differ for the two supplier types: dependent suppliers are more likely to delay bad news and accelerate good news related to litigation outcomes, compared to non-dependent suppliers. Such strategic disclosure patterns in our end-game setting are opposite to those documented in the existing supply chain literature for the repeated-game setting (for example, Hui, Klasa, and Yeung 2012).
引用
收藏
页码:137 / 159
页数:23
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