Complex ownership and capital structure

被引:95
作者
Paligorova, Teodora [1 ]
Xu, Zhaoxia [1 ]
机构
[1] NYU, Polytech Inst, Dept Finance & Risk Engn, New York, NY 10003 USA
关键词
Capital structure; Pyramids; Multiple shareholders; BUSINESS GROUPS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; AGENCY COSTS; LARGE SHAREHOLDERS; LAW; PERFORMANCE; FINANCE; RIGHTS; DEBT;
D O I
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.05.001
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper explores pyramidal firms and their motivations for the use of debt financing. We find that pyramids have significantly higher leverage than non-pyramids and that the use of debt in pyramids is associated with the risk of expropriation. We do not find evidence for the control-enhancing, disciplining, tax-reduction, and risk-sharing explanations for the use of debt financing. Our results indicate that the capital structure of pyramids is affected by the expropriation activities of ultimate owners that have excess control rights. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:701 / 716
页数:16
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