Herding over the career

被引：75

作者：

Avery, CN

Chevalier, JA

机构：

[1] Harvard Univ, Kennedy Sch Govt, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[2] Univ Chicago, Grad Sch Business, Chicago, IL 60637 USA

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1999年 / 63卷 / 03期

关键词：

herding; career concerns; managerial incentives;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00039-7

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We develop a model of decision-making when managers have private information about their abilities. With no private information about ability, managers 'herd'. However, with sufficient private information, managers inefficiently 'anti-herd'. The model potentially illuminates recent empirical work on career concerns. (C) 1999 Published by Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：327 / 333

页数：7