Three-Way Complementarities: Performance Pay, Human Resource Analytics, and Information Technology

被引:176
作者
Aral, Sinan [1 ]
Brynjolfsson, Erik [2 ]
Wu, Lynn [2 ]
机构
[1] NYU, Stern Sch Business, New York, NY 10012 USA
[2] MIT, MIT Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
incentive systems; information technology; performance pay; human resource analytics; complementarity; enterprise systems; ERP; productivity; production function; principal-agent model; ORGANIZATIONAL-CHANGE; INCENTIVE CONTRACTS; ASSET OWNERSHIP; FIRM; PRODUCTIVITY; MANAGEMENT; INNOVATION; PROVISION; COMPUTERS; STRATEGY;
D O I
10.1287/mnsc.1110.1460
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
We test for three-way complementarities among information technology (IT), performance pay, and human resource (HR) analytics practices. We develop a principal-agent model examining how these practices work together as an incentive system that produces a larger productivity premium when the practices are implemented in concert rather than separately. We assess our model by combining fine-grained data on human capital management (HCM) software adoption over 11 years with detailed survey data on incentive systems and HR analytics practices for 189 firms. We find that the adoption of HCM software is greatest in firms that have also adopted performance pay and HR analytics practices. Furthermore, HCM adoption is associated with a large productivity premium when it is implemented as a system of organizational incentives, but has less benefit when adopted in isolation. The system of three-way complements produces disproportionately greater benefits than pairwise interactions, highlighting the importance of including all three complements. Productivity increases significantly when the HCM systems "go live" but not when they are purchased, which can be years earlier. This helps rule out reverse causality as an explanation for our findings.
引用
收藏
页码:913 / 931
页数:19
相关论文
共 37 条
[1]  
[Anonymous], 2006, P 27 INT C INFORM SY
[2]   IT assets, organizational capabilities, and firm performance: How resource allocations and organizational differences explain performance variation [J].
Aral, Sinan ;
Weill, Peter .
ORGANIZATION SCIENCE, 2007, 18 (05) :763-780
[3]   COMPLEMENTARITY AND EXTERNAL LINKAGES - THE STRATEGIES OF THE LARGE FIRMS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY [J].
ARORA, A ;
GAMBARDELLA, A .
JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, 1990, 38 (04) :361-379
[4]   Testing for complementarities in reduced-form regressions: A note [J].
Arora, A .
ECONOMICS LETTERS, 1996, 50 (01) :51-55
[5]  
Athey S., 1998, 66 NAT BUR EC RES
[6]   Contractibility and asset ownership: On-board computers and governance in U. S. trucking [J].
Baker, GP ;
Hubbard, TN .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2004, 119 (04) :1443-1479
[7]   INCENTIVE CONTRACTS AND PERFORMANCE-MEASUREMENT [J].
BAKER, GP .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1992, 100 (03) :598-614
[8]   Performance Evaluation Metrics for Information Systems Development: A Principal-Agent Model [J].
Banker, Rajiv D. ;
Kemerer, Chris F. .
INFORMATION SYSTEMS RESEARCH, 1992, 3 (04) :379-400
[9]   How does information technology affect productivity? Plant level comparisons of product innovation, process improvement, and worker skills [J].
Bartel, Ann ;
Ichniowski, Casey ;
Shaw, Kathryn .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2007, 122 (04) :1721-1758
[10]   Human resource management and organizational performance: Evidence from retail banking [J].
Bartel, AP .
INDUSTRIAL & LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW, 2004, 57 (02) :181-203