Do Managers Withhold Bad News?

被引：1337

作者：

Kothari, S. P. ^{[1
,2
]}

Shu, Susan ^{[3
]}

Wysocki, Peter D. ^{[1
,2
]}

机构：

[1] MIT, Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA

[2] Barclays Global Investors, San Francisco, CA USA

[3] Boston Coll, Carroll Sch Management, Chestnut Hill, MA 02167 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH | 2009年 / 47卷 / 01期

关键词：

STOCK OPTION AWARDS; DISCRETIONARY DISCLOSURE; EARNINGS FORECASTS; DIVIDEND CHANGES; FUTURE PROFITABILITY; INFORMATION-CONTENT; FINANCIAL DISTRESS; INCENTIVES; PERFORMANCE; EQUITY;

D O I：

10.1111/j.1475-679X.2008.00318.x

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

In this study, we examine whether managers delay disclosure of bad news relative to good news. If managers accumulate and withhold bad news up to a certain threshold, but leak and immediately reveal good news to investors, then we expect the magnitude of the negative stock price reaction to bad news disclosures to be greater than the magnitude of the positive stock price reaction to good news disclosures. We present evidence consistent with this prediction. Our analysis suggests that management, on average, delays the release of bad news to investors.

引用

页码：241 / 276

页数：36

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