Corporate governance and risk-taking

被引：1578

作者：

John, Kose ^{[1
]}

Litov, Lubomir ^{[2
]}

Yeung, Bernard ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] NYU, Stern Sch Business, New York, NY 10003 USA

[2] Washington Univ, John M Olin Sch Business, St Louis, MO 63130 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCE | 2008年 / 63卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01372.x

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Better investor protection could lead corporations to undertake riskier but value-enhancing investments. For example, better investor protection mitigates the taking of private benefits leading to excess risk-avoidance. Further, in better investor protection environments, stakeholders like creditors, labor groups, and the government are less effective in reducing corporate risk-taking for their self-interest. However, arguments can also be made for a negative relationship between investor protection and risk-taking. Using a cross-country panel and a U.S.-only sample, we find that corporate risk-taking and firm growth rates are positively related to the quality of investor protection.

引用

页码：1679 / 1728

页数：50

共 59 条

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