Corporate bankruptcy and insider trading

被引:100
作者
Seyhun, HN [1 ]
Bradley, M [1 ]
机构
[1] DUKE UNIV,DURHAM,NC 27706
关键词
D O I
10.1086/209715
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We document significant sales by the insiders of firms filing bankruptcy petitions prior to the filing date. We also find that selling is more intense for top executives and officers and that insiders in general systematically sell stock before prices fall and buy stock after prices have fallen. Although this trading pattern may simply reflect an implicit compensation arrangement between insiders and stockholders, the significant sell-off does raise potential questions regarding managements' incentives to maximize shareholder wealth throughout the Chapter 11 process.
引用
收藏
页码:189 / 216
页数:28
相关论文
共 30 条
[1]   PRIVATE BENEFITS FROM CONTROL OF PUBLIC CORPORATIONS [J].
BARCLAY, MJ ;
HOLDERNESS, CG .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 1989, 25 (02) :371-395
[3]   INSIDERS, OUTSIDERS, AND MARKET BREAKDOWNS [J].
BHATTACHARYA, U ;
SPIEGEL, M .
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, 1991, 4 (02) :255-282
[4]   BIASES IN COMPUTED RETURNS - AN APPLICATION TO THE SIZE EFFECT [J].
BLUME, ME ;
STAMBAUGH, RF .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 1983, 12 (03) :387-404
[5]   THE UNTENABLE CASE FOR CHAPTER-11 [J].
BRADLEY, M ;
ROSENZWEIG, M .
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1992, 101 (05) :1043-1095
[6]  
BRADLEY M, 1995, WORKING PAPER, pCH11
[7]   OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND VOTING ON ANTITAKEOVER AMENDMENTS [J].
BRICKLEY, JA ;
LEASE, RC ;
SMITH, CW .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 1988, 20 (1-2) :267-291
[8]   THE REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING [J].
CARLTON, DW ;
FISCHEL, DR .
STANFORD LAW REVIEW, 1983, 35 (05) :857-895
[9]   THE BEHAVIOR OF THE COMMON-STOCK OF BANKRUPT FIRMS [J].
CLARK, TA ;
WEINSTEIN, MI .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1983, 38 (02) :489-504
[10]   MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP OF VOTING-RIGHTS - A STUDY OF PUBLIC CORPORATIONS WITH DUAL CLASSES OF COMMON-STOCK [J].
DEANGELO, H ;
DEANGELO, L .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 1985, 14 (01) :33-69