The structure of wages and investment in general training

被引:409
作者
Acemoglu, D [1 ]
Pischke, JS [1 ]
机构
[1] MIT, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1086/250071
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In the human capital model with perfect labor markets, firms never invest in general skills and all costs of general training are borne by workers. When labor market frictions compress the structure of wages, firms may pay for these investments. The distortion in the wage structure turns "technologically" general skills into de facto "specific" skills. Credit market imperfections are neither necessary nor sufficient for firm-sponsored training. Since labor market frictions and institutions shape the wage structure, they may have an important impact on the financing and amount of human capital investments and account for some international differences in training practices.
引用
收藏
页码:539 / 572
页数:34
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