企业非效率投资行为研究综述——基于股东与经理利益冲突的视角

被引:21
作者
周红霞
欧阳凌
机构
[1] 上海交通大学先进技术与装备研究院
[2] 上海交通大学管理学院 上海
[3] 上海
关键词
多样化投资; 过度投资; 投资短视; 投资不足;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F830.59 [投资];
学科分类号
120204 ;
摘要
基于股东与经理利益冲突的代理视角,从多样化投资理论、过度投资理论、经理偏向短期或长期项目等方面对企业的非效率投资行为进行了理论和实证综述,分析了我国国有企业非效率投资行为的表现形式和原因,认为增加经理人员的内在激励程度和外部控制权市场力量是提高投资效率的有效措施。
引用
收藏
页码:23 / 29
页数:7
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