改制企业劳动关系的实证分析

被引:81
作者
姚先国
郭东杰
机构
[1] 浙江大学经济学院,浙江大学经济学院
关键词
劳动关系; 激励机制; 不完全契约; 人力资本产权; 职工持股;
D O I
10.19744/j.cnki.11-1235/f.2004.05.013
中图分类号
F272.9 [企业行政管理];
学科分类号
1201 ;
摘要
劳动契约的重复作用、不完全性和社会交换机会的特性,要求激励机制设计必须保持报酬、委托权和工作程序的相互平衡。职工持股共同治理模式下的分享制能够保护人力资本产权的剩余权利,减少劳资双方的道德风险,从而降低劳动契约的不完全性,增强隐含契约的自我强制实施能力。实证研究发现,工资奖金、股份、职位、工龄、职工对管理层和工会的评价等因素都与劳动关系成显著的正相关关系。在新近改制的企业里,对协会的信任程度、对改制方案的态度和对企业长远发展是否有信心等因素也是影响劳动关系的重要因素。
引用
收藏
页码:97 / 107
页数:11
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