带有风险规避型销售商的供需链协调

被引：36

作者：

索寒生

储洪胜

金以慧

机构：

[1] 清华大学自动化系

[2] 清华大学自动化系北京

[3] 北京

来源：

控制与决策 | 2004年 / 09期

关键词：

博弈论; 供需链合同; 风险规避; 协调;

D O I：

10.13195/j.cd.2004.09.83.suohsh.018

中图分类号：

F224 [经济数学方法];

学科分类号：

0701 ; 070104 ;

摘要：

以一个两阶段的供需链系统为背景,针对供需链上决策激励不一致和风险规避效应导致供需链低效的问题,研究了在实践中广泛应用的利益共享合同和批量折扣合同对供需链协调性的影响.证明了两种合同均可克服双重边际效应和风险规避效应,使得供需链协调.并给出了合同参数的设计方案,同时指出在实施上,利益共享合同需强制执行,批量折扣合同自动执行.

引用

页码：1042 / 1044+1049 +1049

页数：4

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