资本市场不完美、信贷配给与公司投资

被引:5
作者
刘康兵 [1 ]
Elmer Sterken [2 ]
尹伯成 [3 ]
机构
[1] 上海大学国际工商与管理学院经济系
[2] 荷兰Groningen大学经济系
[3] 复旦大学经济系
关键词
信息不对称; 外部融资溢价; 信贷配给; 有成本的状态证实;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F832.51 [];
学科分类号
1201 ; 020204 ;
摘要
本文分析了资本市场不完美条件下的公司投资行为,通过一个标准的借贷模型我们证实了Stiglitz和Weiss(1981)的结论,即信贷市场存在均衡配给和(或)歧视。更重要的是,本文进一步证明,均衡信贷配给意味着企业家使用外部融资的边际成本为无穷大,因此,如果投资项目规模是可分的,此时企业家将有不可抗拒的激励削减哪怕是一个货币单位的投资支出进而贷款需求,这种行为导致信贷配给在均衡中消失,信贷市场获得一个出清的均衡结果。本文运用类似方法还证明了信贷歧视也不会成为一种均衡现象。文章最后还表明,不对称信息产生的外部融资溢价使得企业家对初始计划投资的削减幅度、进而其最终实际资本支出取决于厂商拥有的净财富水平。
引用
收藏
页码:19 / 30
页数:12
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