企业技术创新激励的博弈分析

被引:3
作者
夏恩君
机构
[1] 北京理工大学管理与经济学院
关键词
企业技术创新; 厂商; 生产者; 消费者; 商人; 福利增进; 博弈分析; 投资方; 纳什均衡; 贝叶斯均衡; 完全信息博弈;
D O I
10.19625/j.cnki.cn44-1338/f.1999.10.008
中图分类号
F204 [科学技术管理];
学科分类号
020201 ;
摘要
The present text proposes that the urge for technical innovation comes from the expectations of increased welfare distribution by all the interest groups of the society, based on the analysis of the current situation of lack of innovation under the light of theory of producer's surplus and consumer surplus in the economic welfare theorem. Utilizing the Nash Equilibrium of Game theory to analyze the proposed model and proves the supposition. The conclusion is reached over how to stimulate technical innovation and their policy implications.
引用
收藏
页码:19 / 21
页数:3
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