Strategic Interaction in Spending on Environmental Protection:Spatial Evidence from Chinese Cities

被引：23

作者：

Huihui Deng ^{[1
]}

Xinye Zheng ^{[2
]}

Nan Huang ^{[2
]}

Fanghua Li ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Institute of International Economy,University of International Business and Economics

[2] School of Economics,Renmin University of China

[3] Department of Economics,University of California

来源：

China&WorldEconomy | 2012年 / 20卷 / 05期

关键词：

environmental protection; spatial econometrics; strategic interaction;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

X24 [人类、资源、能源与环境的关系]; F299.2 [中国];

学科分类号：

1204 ;

摘要：

<正>In China,the responsibility of protecting the environment lies largely with local governments. Within the framework of spatial econometrics,we investigate empirically the consequence of such an institutional setting.Using city-level data for China,the present study finds that city governments behave strategically in making spending decisions regarding environmental protection.This paper finds that a city government appears to cut its own spending as a response to the rise in environmental protection spending by its neighbors.Hence, environmental protection tends to be underprovided.As a result,we suggest that centralizing the environmental protection responsibility to a higher level of government would be beneficial in terms of controlling pollution in China.

引用

页码：103 / 120

页数：18

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