The hold-up problem in the management of construction projects: A case study of the Channel Tunnel

被引：41

作者：

Chang, Chen-Yu ^{[1
,2
]}

Ive, Graham ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Bartlett School of Construction, Project Management, UCL

来源：

International Journal of Project Management | 2007年 / 25卷 / 04期

关键词：

Asset specificity; Hold-up problem; Procurement system; Quasi-rent; Transaction cost economics;

D O I：

10.1016/j.ijproman.2007.01.001

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

The hold-up problem in the presence of asset specificity poses great transaction hazards. Therefore, having a sound understanding of this problem is an important managerial issue. The purpose of this research is to apply the perspective of transaction cost economics (TCE) to the analysis of three major disputes that arose in the Channel Tunnel project during 1988-94. A special form of asset specificity is identified for construction projects: process specificity. This yields additional insights into the root causes of the hold-up problem. Three parameters, including ungovernable uncertainty, degree of lock-in and amount of money under dispute, are identified. It is shown that the observed connection between bargaining power as specified by this TCE model and the outcomes of dispute resolution is in line with the theoretical predictions. The lesson learnt from this project is that clients should not stretch the protective strength of a lump-sum contract too far and that the hold-up problem can indeed in some circumstances be regarded as both serious and unsolved by existing administrative structures and governance. © 2007 Elsevier Ltd and IPMA.

引用

页码：394 / 404

页数：10

共 15 条

[1]

Anderson G., Roskrow B., The Channel Tunnel story, (1994)

[2]

Coase R.H., The acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors, J Law Econ, XLIII, pp. 15-31, (2000)

[3]

Fetherston D., The amazing story of the undersea crossing of the English Channel, (1997)

[4]

Geyskens I., Steenkamp J.E.M., Kumar N., Make, buy, or ally: a meta-analysis of transaction cost theory, Acad Manage J, 49, 3, pp. 519-543, (2006)

[5]

Klein B., Crawford R.A., Alchian A.A., Vertical integration, appropriable rents, and the competitive contracting process, J Law Econ, 21, October, pp. 297-326, (1978)

[6]

Lee T.K., Png I.P.L., The role of installment payments in contracts for services, Rand J Econ, 21, 1, pp. 83-99, (1990)

[7]

Marsh P., Contract law, Contracting for project management, (2003)

[8]

Masten S.E., Meehan J.W., Snyder E.A., The costs of organization, J Law Econ Org, 7, pp. 1-25, (1991)

[9]

Milgrom P., Roberts J., Economics, organization and management, (1992)

[10]

Shelanski H.A., Klein P.G., Empirical research in transaction cost economics: a review and assessment, J Law Econ Org, 11, 2, pp. 335-361, (1995)

← 1 2 →